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Party autonomy – in the sense of freedom of contract, or self-arrangement
of legal relations by individuals according to their respective will – and
the limits of party autonomy comprise one of the fundamental questions
of national contract and private law, perhaps even the most fundamental.
Today the limits of party autonomy are fixed mainly at the European level,
especially if market structure is the issue and not so much individual weakness.
The question has to be discussed at the European level anew (see below 2).
Diverging views of 15 Member States must be considered. It is not just
the level at which the question is regulated which has changed, but also
the approach. This theme will be developed in the remaining sections. In
Europe, mandatory rules prescribing disclosure prevail, but the substantive
choice of contract contents is left to the parties’ autonomy (see below 3).
In construction, these rules are similar to the traditional mandatory rules
regulating the content of the contract. In their scope, however, they differ
fundamentally from traditional mandatory rules: they are designed to enable
party autonomy, they do not restrict the variety of products and contractual
conditions available. It will be argued that these rules thus remedy market
failure in the case of unavoidable information asymmetries, but at the same
time do not unnecessarily restrict market mechanisms (see below 4). It is
therefore an important development that the European Court of Justice holds,
on the basis of the fundamental freedoms, that information rules must be
preferred to mandatory rules prescribing substance, whenever meaningful
information of the client is possible (see below 5). It will be argued that
indeed the bulk of contract-related secondary EC legislation is about finding
intelligent information mechanisms and thus extending the area of party
autonomy (see below 6). Information is even an overriding principle in core
internal market issues such as the interplay between legal orders (see below
7).
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2. Introducing the topic: The role of party autonomy in the internal
market
Few topics are as important for contract law as party autonomy,1 probably
none as characteristic for its image. Contract law is the core area not only for
private law, but also of the internal market process.2 This can be explained by
the fact that the fundamental freedoms are the basic tools of the Treaty in this
process3 and that they are designed to extend party autonomy across borders.4
The contract is the instrument of party autonomy. In the internal market, party
autonomy means not only orthodox contractual freedom, but also and even
more importantly, the freedom to choose the law applicable and thereby also
to do away with domestic mandatory law (Art. 3 Rome Convention). Among
1. See e.g. Atiyah,”Contract and fair exchange” in id., Essays on Contract (Clarendon
Press, 1986), p. 329; Atiyah, The rise and fall of the freedom of contract (Clarendon Press,
1979); Beale, “Inequality of bargaining power”, 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1986),
123; Buckley (Ed.), The fall and rise of freedom of contract (Duke University Press, 1999);
Thal, “The inequality of bargaining power doctrine – the problem of defining contractual
unfairness”, 8 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1986), 17; Gilmore, The Death of Contract,
(Ohio State University Press, 1974) – which was translated into Italian as Ferri, Il negozio
giuridico fra libertà e norma (Maggioli, 1987); v. Hayek, Law, legislation and liberty – a new
statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy, vol. 2, the mirage of social
justice, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976); in German literature: Bydlinski, Privatautonomie
und objektive Grundlagen des verpflichtenden Rechtsgeschäfts, (Springer, 1967); Coester-
Waltjen, “Die Inhaltskontrolle von Verträgen außerhalb des AGBG”, 190 Archiv für Civi-
listische Praxis (AcP) (1990), 1; Fastrich, Richterliche Inhaltskontrolle im Privatrecht (Beck,
1992); Fikentscher, “Vertrag und wirtschaftliche Macht” in Festschrift for Hefermehl (1971),
p. 41; Flume, “Rechtsgeschäft und Privatautonomie” in Festschrift for Deutscher Juristentag
(1960), p. 135; Lorenz, Der Schutz vor dem unerwünschten Vertrag (Beck, 1997); Raiser,
“Vertragsfunktion und Vertragsfreiheit” in Festschrift for Deutscher Juristentag (1960), p.
101; Rittner, “Über das Verhältnis von Vertrag und Wettbewerb”, 188 AcP (1988), 101; Wolf,
Rechtsgeschäftliche Entscheidungsfreiheit und vertraglicher Interessenausgleich (Keip, 1970).
2. Grundmann, Europäisches Schuldvertragsrecht – das Europäische Recht der
Unternehmensgeschäfte (nebst Texten und Materialien zur Rechtsangleichung) (de Gruyter,
1999), provides comprehensive commentaries to the 40 most important legal measures with
a substantial systematic introduction to the whole discipline and each sub-area; an English
edition will be published by de Gruyter in 2003. The very first pioneer was Quigley, European
Community Contract Law (Kluwer, 1997), providing, among other things, very helpful shorter
commentaries on the relevant case law of the Court of Justice, and with less emphasis on
developing a systematic part; see also Grundmann, “The structure of European contract law”,
(2001) European Review of Private Law, 505; before that, attention was given to the sub-
ject by Basedow, “A common contract law for the common market”, 33 CML Rev. (1996),
1169; Heiss, “Europäisches Vertragsrecht in statu nascendi?”, 36 Zeitschrift für Rechtsver-
gleichung (1995), 54; Kirchner, “Europäisches Vertragsrecht” in Weyers (Ed.), Europäisches
Vertragsrecht (Nomos, 1997), p. 103.
3. The internal market definition is based to a great extent on the fundamental freedoms,
and these are listed at the top of the list of objectives: Art. 3(1) lit. a and c and Art. 4(1) EC.
4. Müller-Graff, “Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und Privatrecht – das Privatrecht in
der europäischen Integration”, (1993) NJW, 13, 14.
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the fundamental freedoms, those related to contracts are more important, both
practically and doctrinally, than those related to organization. These are the
freedom of movement of goods, the freedom to provide services and of capital
movements (Arts. 28, 49, 56 EC).
By European Contract Law, we mean the existing Community regulation
(lex lata) concerning formation, content and termination of contracts. In
national contract law, party autonomy dominates and the limits are seen as
exceptions. However, the trend in the 20th century has been interpreted as
entailing an erosion of party autonomy.5 Although there are distinct detailed
trends in the different European legal orders, there are typically three types
of limits. Probably the least important are the general clauses, mainly bona
mores.6 Apart from these, there is regulation restraining party autonomy
for a common good, mostly economic, and regulation for the protection
of consumers. Common goods are, for instance, the stability of a currency
which may be protected by a prohibition of index clauses,7 or undistorted
competition, which is protected by a prohibition of cartels.
Party autonomy is becoming an important issue of European contract law.
This is due to the fact that the general clauses are the only ones remaining pre-
dominantly within the preserve of national law8 and that the other two types of
limits, which are to be found at the European level, are more important. These
two types concern mass transactions – stereotypes for groups of transactions
and of persons. For these two kinds of limits, the key decisions have now
5. E.g. Atiyah, Gilmore and v. Hayek, supra note 1; Kramer, Die “Krise” des liberalen Ver-
tragsdenkens – eine Standortbestimmung (Fink, 1974); seeing the opposite tendency, Buckley,
supra note 1.
6. See, also for the distinctions in the text, Kötz, Europäisches Vertragsrecht, Bd. I:
Abschluß, Gültigkeit und Inhalt des Vertrages – die Beteiligung Dritter am Vertrag (Mohr,
1996), p. 189–209.
7. On these clauses, see Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance – International
Loans, Bonds and Securities Regulation, 2nd ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 1995), p. 80–92.
8. Bona mores and good faith as a limit have only been taken up in Community law very
rarely, as a basic principle mainly in the unfair contract terms directive (Council Directive
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, O.J. 1993, L 95/29),
moreover in Art. 3(1) and Art. 4(1), Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 Dec. 1986 on
the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial
agents, O.J. 1986, L 382/17. Bona mores and good faith may, however, be applicable as a
general principle limiting rights conferred by any Community measure: see e.g. Case 44/59,
Fiddelaar, [1960] ECR 535 at 547; Case 71/83, Russ, [1984] ECR 2417 at 2431 and 2433;
see Collins,”Good faith in European contract law”, 14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1994),
229, esp. 249–254; Meyer, Bona fides und lex mercatoria in der europäischen Rechtstradition
(Wallstein, 1994); Zimmermann and Whittaker (Eds.), Good faith in European Contract Law
– the Common Core of European Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 2000); justifying
the application of general principles in this respect, Grundmann, “General principles of private
law and ius commune modernum as applicable law?” in Festschrift for Buxbaum (2000), p.
213.
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largely been transplanted to the European level.9 National rules without an
origin in European law measures typically do not regulate market failure, i.e.
structural shortcomings of the functioning of markets, but individual cases,
mostly extraordinary weaknesses of a few persons (low capacity in one way
or another). Therefore, the importance of the topic for European contract law
resides, first, in the fact that the bulk of regulation has shifted from national
to European law.10
A second reason has to do with the functioning of the fundamental
freedoms. As long as they were used to restrict national regulation, Com-
munity law had mainly deregulatory and liberalizing effects. This was no
longer evident once re-regulation, on the basis of harmonization, started.
However, contrary to widespread belief, even in European re-regulation, there
are strong mechanisms against unduly heavy restrictions on party autonomy.
This is even a general characteristic of European contract law. This trend
towards strengthening a “private law society” (“Privatrechtsgesellschaft”)
has to be discussed. This goes so far as to allow private regulators to compete
with public regulators in many situations.11
3. Information rules and substantive mandatory law – status quo in the
internal market
Discussion of the topic as a whole has to be based on the status quo: what
kind of mandatory rules are to be found in European private and contract law
and to what extent? Indeed, many authors see the fact that European contract
9. Survey by Grundmann, supra note 2, p. 56–67; also Quigley op. cit. supra note 2.
10. There is no monograph on this topic yet, but see the papers (both by economists and
lawyers from several countries) in Grundmann, Kerber and Weatherill (Eds.), Party Autonomy
and the Role of Information in the Internal Market (de Gruyter, 2001); and in italian in
Alessi (Ed.), Diritto europeo e autonomia contrattuale (G. Giappichelli, 2000). The topic
is also important in company law. See e.g. Grundmann, “Information und ihre Grenzen im
Europäischen und neuen englischen Gesellschaftsrecht” in Festschrift for M. Lutter (2000),
p. 61; the English company law reform is based very much on this assumption: Modern
Company Law – For a Competitive Economy – The Strategic Framework – A Consultation
Document from the Company Law Review Steering Group, (2/1999), p. 12, 15, 46 et seq., 49
et passim; Modern Company Law – For a Competitive Economy – Developing the Framework
– A Consultation Document from the Company Law Review Steering Group, (3/2000), p. 8,
151 et seq., 49 et passim.
11. As argued by both Kerber and Kirchner, in Grundmann (Ed.), Systembildung und Sys-
temlücken in Kerngebieten des Europäischen Privatrechts – Gesellschaftsrecht, Arbeitsrecht,
Schuldvertragsrecht (Mohr, 2000), the one at p. 67, 91–96, the other at p. 99, 111 et seq.;
dogmatically this postulate can be based on the fundamental freedoms, at least within the
Community, see Grundmann, “Law merchant als lex lata Communitatis – insbesondere die
Unidroit-Principles” in Festschrift for W. Rolland (1999), p. 145, 146–154 and id. op. cit. supra
note 8, 216.
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law is mandatory as its key feature.12 This is questionable, at least if this
means mandatory rules imposing substantive solutions. Two areas have to be
distinguished in European contract law, as two different directorates-general
are responsible for them and, with respect to the topic discussed here, the
approaches differ quite considerably.
3.1. Financial services
Financial services are dealt with by the directorate general for the internal
market (formerly DG XV). In this area, the split between the two types of
mandatory rules named is evident and this split is characteristic not only of
European contract, but also company law. Here, there is a clear preponderance
of information rules, for instance disclosure rules. Information rules prescribe
the giving of information to the less well-informed party and as such these
rules can be termed mandatory. They are different from mandatory rules
prescribing solutions in substance, in that they leave the choice in substance
again to the parties’ autonomy. This preponderance can best be illustrated by
identifying the content of all important Community measures in the field.
Historically the core act in financial services, the Consumer Credit Directive
1986,13 contains only information rules in Articles 3–6. These rules prescribe
for different phases (publicity, pre-contract phase, contract) the giving of
information on the two key parameters: the annual percentage rate and the
total costs of the credit. The first type of information enhances transparency
of the “price”, the key parameter for competition in this type of contract, and
through that competition the supply of consumer credit. Complex data in life
are added and transformed via a uniform formula into one simple figure which
can be easily understood. The second type of information helps the client to
see whether he or she, individually, can afford the credit. Altogether the two
key elements as to the product and as to its suitability for the client have to
be made transparent. Articles 7–11 on the other hand, contain substantive
mandatory rules only on some specific points. For example, the client has the
right to discharge before the time fixed; if the creditor recovers possession of
an item financed, the credit terminates in order to avoid the client having to pay
without having the benefit of use. In case of certain pre-existing agreements
12. E.g. Schiemann, “EG-rechtliche Haftung für Dienstleistungen”, in Schnyder, Heiss and
Rudisch (Eds.), Internationales Verbraucherschutzrecht – Erfahrungen und Entwicklungen in
Deutschland, Liechtenstein, Österreich und der Schweiz (Mohr, 1995), p. 131, 134; or Kirchner,
supra note 11, p. 99, 111.
13. Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 Dec. 1986 for the approximation of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit,
O.J. 1987, L 42/48; amended in O.J. 1990, L 61/14 and O.J. 1998, L 101/17.
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between creditor and seller, rights against the seller also operate against the
creditor.
Equally important for the fund transfer business is the Payments Directive.14
Articles 3–7 again contain information rules for the two key parameters,
costs and execution time, as well as sanctions. Giving no information or
false information triggers default or liability rules. Only Article 8 contains a
mandatory rule prescribing a certain substance for the contract, not merely
the giving of information. This is the money-back-guarantee, under which the
first bank has to compensate the client (up to a certain amount) if the money
is lost in the transfer chain.
Equally important for the third core banking business, investment banking,
is the Investment Services Directive (ISD).15 Only Article 11 concerns the
contractual relationship, though responsibilities here have repercussions on
the organizational duties (Art. 10). Article 11(1), phrase 4 regulates the duties
which investment banks owe their clients quite intensively. They fall into three
categories: indents 1–3 contain the duty of loyalty and the duty of care and a
clarification of some particular aspects of that duty of care. If the client takes
the investment decision him- or herself, i.e. if it is not the bank that manages
the portfolio, these duties only serve as a specification of the core duty in
this respect. In this case, the bank has to comply with its duty of care and of
loyalty when giving information and advice, as well as when executing the
subsequent order. The duty to give information is then contained in indents 4
and 5 and is the core duty. Under European law (as under German and English
law) the client can always take the investment decision himself, which is seen
as the typical constellation. Again, the bank has to give information as to the
financial instrument (product) and to the suitability for the particular client
(the “know your customer” principle).
The Directive is quite specific in this respect and states that all “material”
information has to be given, and must be given in an “appropriate”, i.e.
understandable, way. The duty to give information is formulated here in
a more generic way because the range of relevant facts is much wider in
investment banking. The third duty – the duty to avoid conflicts of interests
and thereby the very danger of not acting with fairness once the conflict
arises – is linked to an information rule as well. In a universal bank system,
such conflict often cannot be avoided. Then it has at least to be disclosed.
14. European Parliament and Council Directive 97/5/EC of 27 Jan. 1997 on cross-border
credit transfers, O.J. 1997, L 43/25.
15. Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities
field, O.J. 1993, L 141/27; amended in O.J. 1995, L 168/7.
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Therefore, there is also a preponderance of information rules in investment
banking regulation.16
As far as contract law goes, the Insurance Directives – life and non-life
–17 introduced nothing but information rules and rules on conflicts of laws.
So far, however, only in life insurance is information on all material issues
required. These information rules were not, however, considered to be suf-
ficient to admit freedom of choice of law (outside the area of large risks).
Such freedom seems to exist, though, where the client establishes the contact
with a foreign insurance abroad and on his own initiative (“active client”).18
Again, information rules dominate, even though the freedom of choice of law
is reserved only for the active client.
3.2. Remaining areas
The general approach differs considerably in the legal measures proposed by
the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection (formerly DG
XXIV). These are primarily the Unfair Contract Terms and the Sales Direct-
ive(s). In addition, concerning formation, we must consider the Door Step
and Distance Selling Directive(s), and, concerning mainly contract contents,
we will look at the Package Travel and Timesharing Directive(s).
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive19 is mainly concerned with the con-
trol of standard terms, i.e. a substantive mandatory rule. The reason for
imposing such a solution is, however, to be found in information economics.
Unavoidable and uncurable information asymmetries are the source of a type
of market failure, first described by Akerlof, which is essentially undisputed
today. Gathering information is much more costly for a client who concludes
one type of standard term contract (often only once), than it is for a business
16. This regulation is supplemented by the insider dealing directive 89/592/EEC (O.J.
1989, L 334/30). The insider dealing prohibition has been condensed very convincingly into
the formula: “disclose or abstain”.
17. In both cases these rules were introduced in the second and third generation of directives.
See references (also for literature) in Grundmann op. cit. supra note 2, 4.30–1/2/3 and 4.31–
1/2/3 “Fundstellenverzeichnisse”; Quigley, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 310–321. See also the
references for the block exemption for the insurance sector, which also concerns standard term
insurance contracts.
18. This is disputed, although it was clear for the second generation of directives. And the
Community legislature made it explicit that the third generation should extend, not restrict,
liberalization. See Grundmann, supra note 2, 4.31 para. 18–21 (commenting on the whole
conflicts of laws system); Hübner and Matusche-Beckmann, “Auswirkungen des Gemein-
schaftsrechts auf das Versicherungsrecht”, 6 EuZW (1995), 263, 266; the opposite view is
taken by Smulders and Glazener, “Harmonization in the field of insurance law through the
introduction of Community rules of conflict”, 29 CML Rev (1992), 775, 793–795.
19. Cited supra note 8 .
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partner who uses it for all transactions and thus splits his costs innumer-
able times. The asymmetry is such that it cannot be cured. This justifies a
mandatory substantive rule.20
The Door Step and the Distance Selling Directives21 contain mainly a right
to revoke the contract within a short period after formation of the contract.
This gives the client the possibility to inform him- or herself about competing
offers and to think about the suitability of the contract without pressure
(cooling-off period) – a possibility which had been taken from him by the
particular type of marketing mechanism. Therefore the revocation right also
has to be interpreted basically as an information right.22 The normal market
mechanism (with the opportunity to compare prices) is restored. The rule
does not replace market forces. It does not forbid, for instance, any marketing
techniques. Apart from the directives mentioned there are pre-contractual
information rules in many Directives, and there is – although not contract law
strictly speaking – the Directive on misleading advertising.23
Information rules are also part of a number of other measures, but do not
dominate them. This is so with the Package Travel Directive, the Timesharing
Directive,24 and also in labour law, where there is one Directive extending the
general information paradigm to labour contracts as well.25 Finally, the Sales
20. See in more detail Adams, “Ökonomische Begründung des AGB-Gesetzes – Verträge
bei asymmetrischer Information”, 44 BB (1989), 781, 787; and, from an economic perspective,
Schäfer and Ott, Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts, 3rd ed. (Springer, 2000),
p. 478–480.
21. Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 Dec. 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of
contracts negotiated away from business premises, O.J. 1985, L 372/31; European Parliament
and Council Directive 97/7/EC of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of
distance contracts, O.J. 1997, L 144/19. Financial services are excluded in both cases. For
life insurance (supra note 17), however, there is a revocation right irrespective of the form of
marketing. And for distance selling there is a separate proposal for a directive on financial
services; see O.J. 1998, C 385/10, COM(98) 468 final.
22. For discussion, inter alia from the perspective of information asymmetry, see Rekaiti
and van den Bergh, “Cooling-off periods in the consumer laws of the EC Member States – a
comparative law and economics approach”, 23 Journal of Consumer Policy (2000), 371.
23. Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 Sept. 1984 relating to the approximation of the
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading
advertising, O.J. 1984, L 250/17; amended in O.J. 1997, L 290/18 (now including comparative
advertising). For a comparative law survey (including transposition) see Schotthöfer (Ed.),
Handbuch des Werberechts in den EU-Staaten einschließlich Norwegen, Schweiz, Liechtenstein
und USA, 2nd ed. (Schmidt, 1997).
24. Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and
package tours, O.J. 1990, L 158/59; European Parliament and Council Directive 94/47/EC of
26 Oct. 1994 on the protection of purchasers in respect of certain aspects of contracts relating
to the purchase of the right to use immovable properties on a timeshare basis, O.J. 1994, L
280/83.
25. Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 Oct. 1991 on an employer’s obligation to inform
employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship, O.J. 1991,
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Directive leaves considerably more leeway to (informed) party autonomy than
many authors believe.26 The rules about whether the goods have attained the
standard required – and this is the starting point – are basically information
rules. If the seller discloses the quality properly, he or she is free to offer
any quality. It is only to the rest of the regulation in this Directive, and only
to the relationship between consumer and retailer, that Article 7 applies,
which imposes mandatory substantive solutions. This mainly concerns the
rights conferred upon the customer once a breach of the required standard is
ascertained.27 To conclude, information rules dominate financial services and
are still strong in the other areas.
4. Restriction of competition and information asymmetries as the main
types of market failure
The discussion also has to take into account the theory behind the question
discussed, i.e. the theory of markets and market failure, refined for our specific
purposes in information economics. The one set of terms is party autonomy
and market freedom, the other is limits to party autonomy and market failure
to be remedied by (State or Community) regulation. Regulation, i.e. State
intervention into market freedom, has been justified since the development
of ordoliberal thinking by identifying a case of market failure. This is still
basically accepted in economics today, especially in institutional economics
as the core branch for an economic analysis of legal rules (“institutions”).28
L 288/32. For a survey on European labour law, see Barnard, EC Employment Law, 2nd ed.
(OUP, 2000); Bercusson, European Labour Law, 2nd ed. (Butterworths, 2000); Blanpain and
Engels, European Labour Law, 8th ed. (Kluwer, 2002). For the information paradigm in this
area, see the contributions by Collins and by Deakin to Grundmann, Kerber and Weatherill,
supra note 10, p. 205 and 371.
26. European Parliament and Council Directive 1999/44/EC of 25 May 1999 on cer-
tain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, O.J. 1999, L
171/12; and COM(95) 520 final. See more in detail Van Gerven and Stijns commentary
to Art. 7 in Bianca and Grundmann (Eds.), EU Sales Directive – Commentary (Intersen-
tia/Hart, 2002); Grundmann, in Grundmann, Medicus and Rolland (Eds.), Europäisches
Kaufgewährleistungsrecht – Reform und Internationalisierung des deutschen Schuldrechts
(Heymanns, 2000) p. 281, 297 et seq. and Riesenhuber, infra note 27.
27. For an interesting analysis of this situation as an information problem which can only
be solved by mandatory law, see Riesenhuber, “Party autonomy and information in the sales
directive” in Grundmann, Kerber and Weatherill, supra note 10, p. 348.
28. See Furubotn and Richter, New institutional economics – an introduction and critical
appraisal, 2nd ed. (University of Michigan Press, 1998), p. 299 et seq. (or other forms of
social organization); Fritsch, Wein and Ewers, Marktversagen und Wirtschaftpolitik, 3rd ed.
(Vahlen, 1999), p. 91–304; Schwartz, “Legal implications of imperfect information in consumer
markets”, 151 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft – Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics (JITE) (1995), 31, 31.
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This is of central importance for the internal market, as ordoliberal thinking
has shaped the economic constitution of the EC. Among the various kinds of
market failure29 two have proved to be of particular importance in European
contract law: restriction of competition and information asymmetries.30
4.1. Undistorted competition as the internal market paradigm
In ordoliberal thinking, the first form of market failure – restriction of com-
petition – was predominant. For Eucken, State order in free markets equalled
a “competition order” (“Wettbewerbsordnung”).31 Competition law was the
only substantive law to be regulated in the Treaty itself (today Arts. 81–86
EC) and not be postponed to secondary legislation (with Community compet-
ences even in administration). Moreover, it was supplemented by important
institutions which were hitherto unknown, mainly those binding even States
to competition standards (State enterprises; law on State aids and later, mainly
in secondary law, on public procurement).
Competition law stricto sensu is only one side. Undistorted competition is
the paradigm of the internal market, and goes far beyond narrow competition
law. All fundamental freedoms are based on it32 and, today, this paradigm
also influences those authors who postulate competition of regulators or legal
ideas in Europe.33
29. See e.g Fritsch, Wein and Ewers, op. cit. supra note 28.
30. The third major form of market failure, externalities, are of little importance here.
This is so because of privity of contracts. This is different only with respect to restriction of
competition, which may also be a case of externalities but is normally treated separately.
31. Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik , 6th ed. (Mohr, 1990), p. 241 et seq.
32. See not only Art. 28, 39, 43, 49, 56, but also Art. 97 et seq. EC; and e.g. Epiney, “Art.
28(3)” in Callies and Ruffert (Eds.), Kommentar zum EU-Vertrag und EG-Vertrag (Luchter-
hand, 1999).
33. Bratton, McCahery, Picciotto and Scott (Eds.), International Regulatory Competition
and Coordination – perspectives on economic regulation in Europe and the United States
(Clarendon, 1996), p. 127, 140; Charny, “Competition among jurisdictions in formulating
corporate law rules – an American perspective on the race to the bottom in the European
Communities”, 32 Harv. Int’l L.J. (1991), 423; Hauser and Hösli, “Harmonization or regulatory
competition in the EEC (and the EEA)”, 46 Aussenwirtschaft (1991), 497; see Kerber, supra
note 11, p. 67, 91–96; Kerber, “Interjurisdictional competition within the European Union”,
23 Fordham Int’l L.J. (2000), S217; Siebert and Koop, “Institutional competition – a concept
for Europe?”, 45 Aussenwirtschaft (1990), 439; Sun and Pelkmans, “Regulatory competition
in the Single market”, 33 JCMS (1995), 67; Vanberg and Kerber, “Institutional competition
among jurisdictions – an evolutionary approach”, 5 Constitutional Political Economy (1994),
193; Woolcock, The Single European Market – Centralization or Competition among National
Rules (Royal Inst. of Internat. Affairs, 1994), p. 20–24.
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4.2. Information as an instrument to foster party autonomy
4.2.1. Information asymmetries: A problem for party autonomy
For this paper, a second form of market failure is still more important. This
form may have a direct impact on virtually any type of contract, not only con-
tracts concluded by public authorities and enterprises which are able to restrict
competition. This form of market failure is omnipresent not only in European
contract law, but also in company law. This is information asymmetry.
Information on the relevant parameters is a condition for rational wealth-
maximizing decision-making and thus for the functioning of markets. How-
ever, not every information asymmetry is negative. The fact that information
can be distributed asymmetrically constitutes the key incentive for produ-
cing information and is indispensable for the selection process in markets.
Information asymmetries are problematic only if one side cannot overcome
them, or only at excessive costs. In these cases, one side unavoidably acts on
too narrow an information basis: the market structure is defective unless the
information basis is equalized. For the moment, we leave open whether and
when this task can be left to the markets or whether the regulator has to step
in and prescribe mandatory disclosure.
The mechanism of market failure in case of information asymmetries has
been described in the 1970s: if the demand side cannot judge the quality
of offers (goods, services, contract conditions) it can only evaluate the offer
according to prices. It will evaluate the offer at most at average price or rather
below it. Offers of high quality do not reach higher prices. The (additional)
costs for quality will not be compensated. In this case not only will demand not
distinguish between good and bad offers, but good offers are systematically
driven out of the market. There is a race to the bottom, a market that produces
more and more “lemons”. When describing the phenomenon in 1970 Akerlof
called it the “market for lemons”.34
Today, if there are enough competitors in a market, unequal bargaining
power of consumers and sellers, i.e the so-called consumer contract law, is
explained as being founded on a problem of information asymmetries.35 One
side in the market possesses considerably more relevant information because
34. Akerlof, “The market for ’lemons’: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism”, 84
Quarterly Journal of Economics (1970), 488; today Emons, “Warranties, moral hazard, and
the lemons problem”, 46 Journal of Economic Theory (1988), 16; Fritsch, Wein and Ewers,
supra note 28, p. 262–269; also Furubotn and Richter, supra note 28, p. 236–241.
35. Fleischer, Informationsasymmetrie im Vertragsrecht (Beck, 2001); Kerton and Bodell,
“Quality, choice and the economics of concealment – the marketing of lemons”, 29 Journal
of Consumer Affairs (1995), 1, esp. 20–24; Schäfer, “Grenzen des Verbraucherschutzes und
adverse Effekte des Europäischen Verbraucherrechts” in Grundmann, supra note 11, p. 559,
559–564; Schwartz, op. cit. supra note 28, 35–46; Strassner, Verbraucherinformationsrecht –
rechtliche Grundlagen und rechtsökonomische Aspekte (ÖR-Verlag, 1992), p. 126–136.
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it acts professionally in the market, or because it created the product. In the
national legislation of many western countries this has been discussed in rela-
tion to standard contract terms.36 The gathering of information is excessively
costly for those players in the market who use it only occasionally, because
they have to allot the costs to far fewer transactions. Therefore, the difference
in costs between the two sides of the market is particularly high where there is
particular professional knowledge. The distribution of information is structur-
ally asymmetric. This is not necessarily the case only for private consumers.
Indeed, about half of the legal measures in European contract law are also
applicable to and in favour of professional clients. In financial services, this
is so in all cases but one. If the asymmetric distribution concerns information
relevant for the contract, the contract mechanism is no longer a guarantee for
normally adequate results (“Richtigkeitsgewähr”). Levelling the information
positions in the parameters relevant to the transaction becomes necessary – if
all else fails, by State intervention.
4.2.2. Information rules – often mandatory, but aimed at party autonomy
Information rules in European contract and company law are mostly man-
datory. Disclosure of the relevant parameters is not left to the choice of the
parties. Two aspects are of interest.
On the one hand, there is an important difference between mandatory
information rules and mandatory substantive rules. The latter reduce variety
– either to one possibility only or to a smaller range of possibilities (typ-
ically in unfair contract terms law). Markets such as the German insurance
market seem to show that this often has cartellizing effects. Still more import-
ant for the topic discussed here: reducing variety means reducing offers
which match individual preferences. Individual preferences, however, are
nowadays the basic point of reference for economic theory-building (normat-
ive individualism).37 A substantive mandatory rule can be justified only if an
information rule cannot remedy the market failure. This is so because inform-
ation rules may be mandatory by construction (the duty to disclose is not
subject to party autonomy), but they are always aimed at enabling the parties
36. See comparative survey on different approaches in different Member States to con-
trolling standard term contracts: COM(90) 322 FIN – SYN 285, p. 6–64; v. Hippel, 41 RabelsZ
(1977) 237, (expert opinion for the Commission); Kötz, supra note 6, p. 211–220.
37. Furubotn and Richter, supra note 28, p. 3; and more in detail Schäfer and Ott, supra
note 20, p. 55–69. From a constitutional law perspective it has been argued convincingly that
consumers may not be restricted unduly in the freedom of choice, also with regard to product
variety: Drexl, Die wirtschaftliche Selbstbestimmung des Verbrauchers – eine Studie zum
Privat- und Wirtschaftsrecht unter Berücksichtigung gemeinschaftsrechtlicher Bezüge (Mohr,
1998), p. 217–280.
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to take an autonomous decision in substance.38 The full range of varieties
matching preferences remains open.
On the other hand, many authors doubt that information rules have to be
mandatory.39 Informing the demand side is seen as a competition paramet-
er in the long run. The argument runs that sellers offering better products
or conditions have an interest in informing the market, and that the shap-
ing of information is then more flexible than under uniform State disclosure
rules. Empirically, however, information markets have not proven to be very
efficient. Costs and execution time of cross border fund transfers were not
disclosed before the coming into force of the Directive. Consumer credit mar-
kets were not transparent before EC rules were enacted. Insurance companies
do not seem to be interested in high market transparency. Stereotyping the
information to be disclosed is not such a disadvantage if it is fairly clear
which information is relevant to the transaction (fund transfers, consumer
credits, etc.). Otherwise there is enough flexibility if “material information”
has to be disclosed, the best offer being clearly more visible if all parts of the
market have to disclose in the same standardized way. In all this, State or EC
disclosure rules have advantages, especially if a bigger market is still in statu
nascendi.
5. Supremacy of party autonomy over substantive mandatory law
under the EC Treaty
The EC Treaty and the fundamental freedoms constitute a primary framework
for an information model in European private law.
5.1. The Cassis de Dijon case law
Few decisions of the European Court of Justice had such effect as that in Cas-
sis de Dijon of 1979.40 Even the minimum harmonization approach, preferred
since 1985 and for the internal market, was mainly based on it.41 Moreover,
38. In this sense see also Schwartz, op. cit. supra note 28, 32.
39. An in-depth discussion is impossible here. See, in more detail, Hadfield, Howse and Tre-
bilcock, “Information-based principles for rethinking consumer protection policy”, 21 Journal
of Consumer Policy (1998), 131, esp. 141–150; Gertner and Fishman and Hagerty, “Disclosure
and Unravelling” and “Mandatory Disclosure” in Newman (Ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics (Macmillan, 1998).
40. Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, [1979] ECR 649.
41. Completing of the Internal Market – White paper of the Commission to the European
Council, COM(85) 310 final, p. 18 et seq., 27 et passim; see Hayder, “Neue Wege der
europäischen Rechtsangleichung – die Auswirkungen der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte von
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this judgment is the basis for a European information model.42 The Court
based the judgment on the fundamental freedoms and the principle of propor-
tionality inherent to them:43 if a national legislature can attain its objective
by prescribing information to be supplied to the person to be protected, the
mere information rule has to be preferred to a substantive mandatory rule, a
command or prohibition. Germany intended to protect purchasers of liquors
from being cheated by prescribing a minimum percentage of alcohol in them.
The Court held that simply informing the clients by way of labelling was
sufficient. The case law acts here as a negative standard: it excludes certain
types of national rule setting, i.e. certain national mandatory rules. The same
holds, however, for the Community legislature.44
The factual situation was such that postulating the supremacy of an inform-
ation rule was particularly convincing in the case. The conditions for an
information model were absolutely fulfilled. On the one hand, the information
to be given was not so complex that the other side had to incur considerable
transaction and information costs. The party to be protected could process
the information easily and take a meaningful decision on its basis. On the
other hand, this information could be used for a decision in total freedom.
Both conditions – meaningful information and freedom of choice – can be
problematic in certain cases in company law. In contract law typically only
the former.
5.2. The public procurement case law
Some judgments on public procurement concern a second aspect. On the
basis of the fundamental freedoms, they develop a duty of public authorities
to inform (potential) bidders. Fundamental freedoms then act as a positive
1986”, 53 RabelsZ (1989), 622, esp. 632–634; Bruha, “Rechtsangleichung in der Europäischen
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft – Deregulierung durch ‘Neue Strategie”’, 46 ZaöRV (1986) 1, 7 et
seq., 10 et seq., 12 et seq.
42. See e.g. Commission, “Consumer policy – second commission three-year plan 1993–
1995 – placing the single market at the service of European consumers”, COM(93) 378 final,
p. 16: “Information is essential if the consumer is to enjoy the advantages of the single market.”
43. For the proportionality principle see Art. 5(2) EC; Case C-233/94, Germany v. European
Parliament and Council, [1997] ECR I-2405, 2459–2462; Case C-97/95, Pascoal, [1997] ECR
I-4209, 4255–4258; De Búrca, “The principle of proportionality and its application in EC law”,
13 YEL (1993), 105, 114–126; Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law – a
comparative study (Kluwer, 1996). One aspect is that consumers may not be restricted unduly
in the freedom of choice, also as to product variety: see Drexl, supra note 37, p. 217–280.
44. Joined Cases 80/77 and 81/77, Commissionaires Réunies and Fils de Henri Ramel,
[1978] ECR 927, 944–947; Case 41/84, Pinna, [1986] ECR 1, 25 (implicitly); Case C-341/95,
Bettati, [1998] ECR I-4355, 4380 et seq.; cf. the monographs by Scheffer, Die Marktfreiheiten
des EG-Vertrages als Ermessensgrenzen des Gemeinschaftsgesetzgebers (Lang, 1997); and
Schwemer, Die Bindung des Gemeinschaftsgesetzgebers an die Grundfreiheiten (Lang, 1995).
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standard45 and they impose duties on a party to the contract. This has a
re-regulatory effect.
The basic problem in public procurement was that its share in the EU gross
income is about 11.5%, a huge industry, but that contracts were allotted to
foreign bidders in less than 1% of all cases.46 For many different reasons,
it often occurred that the best offer (in quality or price) was not chosen, but
reasons pertaining to the bidder were decisive, often discriminating against
foreign bidders.47 Already in the late 1980s, the Cecchini report estimated the
harm caused to public treasuries and the economy in the EU as being near 15
billion Euro a year.48 Information rules help to prevent discrimination. Hidden
discrimination is also forbidden and there are many forms. A public authority
can insist on domestic security standards even though foreign standards are
equivalent.49 Or it can ask that a certain share of the turnover of the bidder
be made in the region.50 Hidden discrimination is possible, inter alia if the
public authority gives information only to domestic bidders or on occasions
where typically only domestic bidders are present or in local media. The same
is true for cases in which the authority specifies security standards according
to domestic terminology, thus creating higher information costs for foreign
bidders. All these practices led to the introduction of a genuinely European
publication tool for public procurement, which has to be used to inform all
bidders at the same cost and very early.51
45. One problem of interpreting the decisions is that most of them are based on the fun-
damental freedoms and on the rules in the directives: Case 76/81, Transporoute, [1982] ECR
417, 428; Case 45/87, Dundalk, [1988] ECR 4929, 4962–4965; Case C-21/88, Mezzogiorno,
[1990] ECR I-889, 919 and 921.
46. COM(96) 583 final, p. 9 (720 billion ECU); European Commission – Eurostat, Panora-
ma of EU Industry 97, 2 vols.: an extensive survey on the situation and the perspectives for the
sectors of industry and services in the European Union, (1997), p. 38. In the early 1990s only
0.14% of public procurement was ordered cross border: Cecchini, Europe 92 – the advantage
of the internal market (EC Office of official publications, Brussels, 1988), p. 37.
47. Business cycle, regional and sectoral policies, but also outright nepotism, see e.g. Arrow-
smith,”Public procurement as an instrument of policy and the impact of market liberalization”,
111 Law Quarterly Review (1995), 235; or from an economic point of view Gandenberger,
“Öffentliche Auftragsvergabe” (sub D), in Handwörterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaften,
vol. 5 (Fischer, 1988), p. 405, 411 et seq.
48. Supra note 46, Cecchini, p. 37–39; and even higher: EC Commission, Vademecum, O.J.
1987, C 358/1 (1) (half of the Community budget).
49. Dundalk, cited supra note 45, 4964 et seq.
50. Case C-360/89, Commission v. Italy, [1992] ECR I-3401, 3420; for regional preferences,
see already Case C-21/88, Mezzogiorno, [1990] ECR I-889, 919–922.
51. Publication is made primarily on the electronic data base TED (Tenders Electronic Daily)
which is run by the Community and thus provides the information Community-wide in one
standard way: see Art. 9(6) of the Council Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating
procedures for the award of public supply contracts, O.J. 1993, L 199/1; amendment in O.J.
1997, L 328/1 (and Adhesion Acts); parallel rules are always to be found in the directives
on public works and public service contracts; however, with respect to TED also the fourth
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5.3. The Centros case law
A third line of cases transposes the Cassis de Dijon reasoning to company
law and the freedom of establishment. Here too, the Court has opted for an
information model since 1999. In the Centros case,52 the Court upheld the
choice of another law for questions of minimum capitalization, although the
host country wanted to apply its own law to the case. In the Court’s view, the
host country, Denmark, had not proved that mandatory reasons of public good
justified an application of Danish law. The Court gave two reasons, each of
them sufficient in itself. It decided that the mandatory reasons invoked had at
least not been applied consistently. It then held, decisive in our context, that
by using the firm of a private English (Limited) Company, Centros Ltd., it had
made clear to the public that it disposed only of capital according to English
law. And this did not necessarily include a fixed minimum capital. The Court
thus gave supremacy to the English information rule inherent in the English
registration process over mandatory Danish law regulating the substance,
here minimum capitalization. With respect to an information model, the main
difference with Cassis de Dijon seems to be that information of the persons
to be protected, mainly creditors, was more difficult. It is easier to read the
percentage of alcohol on a label than to find out that English law does not
contain a minimum capitalization prerequisite. Much of the harsh criticism
of the Centros judgment on the continent53 may be due to this. However,
the first impression is misleading. Stated capital has to be disclosed all over
Europe in a particular register (Art. 2(1) lit. c and e and Art. 3 lit. b and c of
the 1st and the 2nd Company Law Directives). The mechanism for finding the
information is thus known to all creditors from their own country. Moreover,
the result of the application of the law is a figure, and thus easy to understand.
This register also contains the information that a company does not have a
(minimum) capital at all. The only problem is that finding and consulting the
register may be more difficult abroad. It is therefore plausible to ask here for
a European register (as with public procurement), which contains the entries
directive runs parallel and contains the same rule in Art. 25: see Council Directive 93/38/EEC
of 14 June 1993 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water,
energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, O.J. 1993, L 199/84, amended by Directive
94/22/EEC, O.J. 1994, L 164/3 and Directive 98/4EC, O.J. 1998, L 101/1. See in general
Arrowsmith, “E-commerce policy and the EC procurement rules: The chasm between rhetoric
and reality”, 38 CML Rev., 1447–1477.
52. Case C-212/97, Centros, [1999] ECR I-1459.
53. See e.g. Kegel, “Editorial: Something is rotten in the state of Denmark”, (8/1999)
Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht – Betriebs-Berater für Europarecht (EWS); less
pungent, but also critical: Lutter, “Das Europäische Unternehmensrecht im 21. Jahrhundert”,
(2000) Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht (ZGR), 1, 9.
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made and checked in the national registers.54 This shows that, contrary to
current interpretation,55 the 2nd Company Law Directive (Capital Directive)
does not contain information rules only in Articles 2 and 3. The rules on stated
capital – payment and evaluation of contributions – have to be interpreted as
information rules as well. Because of these rules, the information given about
stated capital has a standardized and uniform meaning, which makes it more
transparent and reliable.56
6. EC directives fostering party autonomy via information rules
An information model in European secondary law resides on two pillars. It
must be possible to inform the protected party in a meaningful way, and the
person must be able to react (freedom of choice). In European contract law
only the first aspect is important, in European company law potentially also the
second. If there is no freedom of choice an information rule typically cannot
substitute a substantive mandatory rule. Freedom of choice may, however,
also mean that of a third party, for instance the public’s capacity to react. The
following discussion will concentrate on the first aspect.
6.1. Is meaningful information possible?
6.1.1. Simple information (search and observation goods)
Information is meaningful if it enables the other party to take a rational wealth-
maximizing decision: that party must receive the relevant information and be
able to process it. According to economic theory, this is the case with search or
observation goods.57 Here, one can check the quality of the product through
inspection. The equivalent is information which is certified, e.g. via inspection
by a third and neutral party and/or sufficient liability rules. Rules which bring
about this simplest status of information, i.e. rules which transform goods
into search goods can be found in European contract law under labelling
provisions. Revocation rights also have to be referred to: goods which had
54. Lutter, supra note 53, at 10.
55. Dorresteijn, Kuiper and Morse, European Corporate Law (Open University, Faculty of
Law, 1994), p. 40; Lutter, supra note 53, at 3 and 10.
56. See Grundmann (2000), supra note 10, for more detail on all these questions and
considering Centros from an information perspective.
57. As for search goods and experience and credence goods, see the pioneering works of
Nelson, “Information and consumer behaviour”, 78 Journal of Political Economy (1970), 311;
Darby and Karni, “Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud”, 16 Journal of Law and
Economics (1973), 67; and today Magat, “Information regulation”, in Newman (Ed.), The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Macmillan, 1998); Furubotn and Richter, supra note 28,
p. 318–326; Schäfer and Ott, supra note 20, p. 465 et seq.
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been search goods in traditional marketing processes can lose their quality
in a different marketing process, but can regain it via revocation rights.58
A comparison of conditions and prices becomes possible again. Information
to be given according to the Package Travel and the Timesharing Directives
discloses qualities which would be visible later, but are not evident at the
moment of formation of the contract. Experience goods are thus transformed
into search goods. It is, however, disputed whether too much information is
asked for. This not only burdens the seller (excessively) but, even worse, it can
induce the demand side not to consider the information given or to consider
it only selectively and then potentially not in its most relevant points.59
If a legislature wants other goods to gain the qualities of search goods and
uses information rules for this purpose there is a need to guarantee correctness,
e.g. via liability. Also in contract law, the States have a duty already under the
EC Treaty to guarantee efficient liability rules. According to the case law of
the Court of Justice, violation of duties based on EC law has to be sanctioned
in an “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” way.60 This may mean, inter
alia, strict liability and no fixing of lump sum damages below average.61
Economic theory puts experience goods on the same footing as search
goods under certain preconditions. These are goods whose quality cannot be
assessed at the time of formation of the contract, but only when using them. In
certain cases, there is no good case for State regulation because market failure
is unlikely with these goods as well: in markets where typically the game is
repeated, i.e. the client enters into the same transaction several times, negative
experience reduces demand with a particular seller and this is an incentive
for him to produce quality. One example is a restaurant which profits from
regular custom. In EC law (and any other legal order), this idea produces
negative effects first. State intervention can be seen as superfluous. Labelling
58. See the similar idea in a classic example in information economics: rules which prescribe
that number or other easily recognizable qualities of goods which have been hidden by their
packaging have to be disclosed again on the label: supra note 20, Schäfer and Ott, p. 465 et
seq.
59. For the timesharing directive: Mäsch, “Die Time-Sharing-Richtlinie im Europäischen
Verbraucherschutzrecht – Licht und Schatten im Europäischen Verbraucherschutzrecht”, 6
EuZW (1995), 8, 11 and 14; Martinek, “Unsystematische Überregulierung und kontrain-
tentionale Effekte im Europäischen Verbraucherschutzrecht oder: Weniger wäre mehr” in
Grundmann, supra note 11, p. 511, 521–530. However, the duty to give “accurate information”
could include a duty to use a transparent arrangement and to be as concise as necessary. Such a
duty is to be found at least in Art. 5 of the unfair contract terms Directive, and the Commission
now seems to consider that such a duty is inherent in any information rule: O.J. 2001, C 255/1,
255/40 et seq.
60. Case 68/88, Commission v. Greece, [1989] ECR 2965, 2985; Case C-326/88, Hansen,
[1990] ECR I-2911, 2935.
61. Case 14/83, von Colson and Kamann, [1984] ECR 1891, 1908; Case 79/83, Harz, [1984]
ECR 1921, 1941 et seq.; and Case C-271/91, Marshall II, [1993] ECR I-4367, 4409; Case
C-180/95, Draempaehl, [1997] ECR I-2195, 2219–2225.
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rules therefore mainly concern information which cannot be detected by
experience (e.g. ingredients). Door step and distance selling contracts can
be similar. They may have considerable importance, but termination is often
possible only with considerable losses (private health insurance). Often in
these cases, markets are such that the game is not played repeatedly between
the same partners. A good example is timesharing. The more transactions are
anonymous, the higher is the potential need for regulation because the danger
of exit does not hit the seller strongly and opportunism becomes more likely.
There are, of course, market alternatives such as building up a reputation,
for instance with brands. These instruments, however, have problems as well.
One is that smaller enterprises are often unable to build up similar reputations
(irrespective of real quality).
6.1.2. Reducing complexity of information
Rules that reduce complex information to information which is simple enough
to be processed by the average client are also important.62 Many rules in
European contract law are aimed exactly at this. This regulatory choice should
always be carefully considered.
Important examples are to be found in the annual percentage rate, or the total
costs of consumer credits. Complex phenomena are reduced to a simple figure
and comparison is rendered much easier. In this process, however, it is the
legislature who fixes which parameters are relevant. He can include too little:
the problem of excessive prices has mostly been solved in consumer credits
by introducing the annual percentage rate but consumer insolvency remains
a problem.63 Even taking only information rules, more could be conceived:
there is no provision that information about “total costs” should include model
calculations of how costs develop in case of default and the consequences of
62. EC law takes an average consumer as its standard, whereas German law protected
consumers where a fairly simplistic consumer could misunderstand the advertisment: see e.g.
Sack, “Das Verbraucherleitbild und das Unternehmensleitbild im europäischen und deutschen
Wettbewerbsrecht”, (1998) Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis, 264 but see now Köhler and
Piper, Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2nd ed. (Beck, 2001) 63, paras. 50–56. This
difference is even more important in the questions discussed here. In unfair competition, also
protecting simplistic consumers only means that advertisments have to be (over)explicit. In
the question discussed here, however, also protecting simplistic consumers would lead to
the reduction of the range of qualities or conditions for all consumers, so also the 90% less
simplistic.
63. Very early already: Holzschek, “Konsumentenkreditaufnahme und Verbraucherver-
schuldung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, Münstermann, “Zu dem Vorschlag einer
EG-Richtlinie über den Verbraucherkredit”, and Steppeler, “Vorvertragliche Information, Ver-
tragsabschluß und Widerrufsrecht im Entwurf einer EG-Verbraucherkredit-Richtlinie und in
nationalen Verbraucherkreditgesetzen”, all three in Hörmann (Ed.), Verbraucherkredit und
Verbraucherinsolvenz – Perspektiven für die Rechtspolitik aus Europa und den USA (Bremen
Univ., Dr.-Schr.-Lager, 1986), p. 66 and p. 610 et seq. and p. 592–595.
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unemployment – the two typical cases. Whether information would produce
effects here or not is, however, questionable given the experience with tobacco
advertisements. Requiring information on all relevant facts is a more open rule
which, however, is less predictable in its application. Other legal measures
are also aimed at reducing complex information. The Payments Directive
constitutes one example, and similar solutions are conceivable within the
insurance sector.
6.1.3. Information intermediaries extending party autonomy (investment
and insurance)
The role information intermediaries may play can be deduced a contrario from
the afore-mentioned points. In the cases of search goods, or of experience
goods in a repeated game situation, (and also in cases of goods which become
search goods by reducing the complexity of information), it is sufficient to
inform the client himself. This is different with experience goods in other
situations and with credence goods – goods with qualities that cannot be
detected by the client during the use of the item. In these cases, there is
similar professionality needed on the demand side.
If the value of the good is such to pay for it, the use of information
intermediaries can be compensated. This allows for maintaining freedom
and choice and variety of products. The alternative would be to accept that
there is market failure and impose a substantive mandatory solution. An
example for this latter solution is in most countries the law on unfair contract
terms. An example of the first solution is the already existing EC law on
investment intermediaries and the proposal of an EC directive on insurance
intermediaries, which would contain a similar intermediary solution.64 As
in investment services, a permission prerequisite would be introduced, for
reliability and partly also for solvency standards. But, the home country’s
permission must then be accepted by all Member States (European passport).
The model is particularly clear in the regime which already exists. Invest-
ment banks act as information intermediaries in investment services. They
process complex information which issuers give in standardized disclosure
instruments (prospectuses, interim statements, on the spot disclosure of new
material facts). These instruments are so complex that only equally pro-
fessional circles can process them (mainly institutional investors, analysts
and intermediaries). Intermediaries then have the duty to inform the client
according to Article 11(1)(4) indents 4 and 5 ISD on the product (financial
instrument) and on the suitability of that product for the particular client –
64. See more in detail for both forms and for the following: Grundmann and Kerber,
“Information Intermediaries and Party Autonomy – the example of securities and insurance
markets” in Grundmann, Kerber and Weatherill, supra note 10, p. 264 (also for references for
the legal measures and the very recent initiatives in insurance mediation).
Information, party autonomy and agents 289
paying particular attention to his degree of professionality as stated in the
Directive. In sum, the core task of information intermediaries is to trans-
form complex and standardized information into information appropriate to
the individual client, i.e. reduce complexity and apply the information to the
individual case.65
The use of information intermediaries has its advantages, but also its prob-
lems to which legal regulation has to respond. Information intermediaries
should basically guarantee adequate information of the client. The advant-
ages can be enhanced by a legal regime. Using information intermediaries
leads, first, to economies of scale and of scope. Intermediaries create inform-
ation in the form of general expertise and specifically for certain products, in
both respects for a much larger number of cases than clients. Cost of gathering
information can be better amortized, therefore allowing for broader and more
pertinent knowledge to be acquired. A more rational choice can be taken from
a broader range of products. Economies of scale concern both the instrument
and the suitability for the particular client. In-depth studies and expertise are
necessary also for the second aspect. This advantage of information inter-
mediaries is fostered in EC law mainly by giving intermediaries a European
passport. They can thus offer their services and knowledge about products
(e.g. an Irish insurance policy) to a broader public. Information intermedi-
aries can also reduce or do away with principal-agent problems (conflicts of
interests) between client and seller. If the intermediary does not have finan-
cial ties with the issuer or insurer, he will judge products more objectively.
This concerns both the issuer or insurer (e.g. his solvency) and the contract
conditions.
The use of information intermediaries also has problems. Reducing these is
(obviously) the core aim of the legal regime. Most importantly, intermediaries
can have conflicts of interests with clients, which are often less noticable. For
example, a very real problem in the investment and insurance industries, is
when the intermediary has an interest in large transaction volumes because
his remuneration will be calculated on them.66
The ISD obliges intermediaries to avoid conflicts of interests, if feasible, or
at least to disclose them (Art. 11(1)(4) indent 6). This rule is not taken very
65. See e.g. Grundmann and Kerber supra note 64, p. 264; Heinze, Europäisches Kapital-
marktrecht – Recht des Primärmarktes (Beck, 1999), p. 376–386.
66. Churning and similar ways of promoting transactions for income purposes violate
the duty of loyalty, which is to be found in Art. 11(1)(4) indent 1 ISD and in all fidu-
ciary relationships, brokers also. For investment services see e.g. Cahn, “Grenzen des Markt-
und Anlegerschutzes durch das WpHG”, 162 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und
Wirtschaftsrecht (1998) 1, 39; Rössner and Arendts, “Die Haftung wegen Kontoplünderung
durch Spesenschinderei (Churning)”, (1996) Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (WM), 1517, esp. 1525
et seq.; Koller, § 31 WpHG, para. 11, 16 et seq., in Assmann and Schneider (Eds.), Wertpa-
pierhandelgesetz – Kommentar, 2nd ed. (Schmidt, 1999).
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seriously. A bank which markets an instrument issued by an affiliate may
not underline these financial ties, but use it as a means of publicity (“affiliate
of our house”). The bank must, however, also disclose the mechanism of
conflicts of interests emanating from these ties. Three degrees of conflict
can be distinguished (also in recent legislation). The conflict is strong, if
the intermediary has financial ties with the seller (issuer) and there is a
remuneration interest in the transaction which, moreover, differs from product
to product. Products of members of the group are offered more easily. De facto,
the freedom of the client in Germany to choose is not much bigger than with
one firm’s intermediary selling only the products of his firm.67 Typically, the
client does not even realize this. The conflict is attenuated if the intermediary
does not have such ties to one issuer and the commissions are the same for all
products. To introduce this as a mandatory rule was unthinkable in a universal
bank system. The protection of professional titles or denominations (e.g.
“independent broker”) could have similar effects, i.e. an information model
which would leave freedom of choice to the intermediaries. A precondition for
the functioning of this latter solution would be that the title or denomination
is increasingly understood. Contrary to the case with a mandatory rule, the
market can still decide whether intermediaries with such financial ties may in
fact produce better results for clients for other reasons, for instance because
of better economies of scale.
The third mechanism where the incentive structure is best could again be
prescribed as a mandatory rule or be helped by protection of a denomination.
This is neither the case nor the plan in either the investment service or the
insurance business. The best incentive structure is to be found with inter-
mediaries who only sell information for which their remuneration, however,
does not depend on the transaction volume. This type of intermediary may be
in a difficult position anyway because clients may be inclined to pay only if
they complete the transaction. Protecting a meaningful denomination could
help. In one respect the existing Community regulation is counterproductive
and even handicaps the intermediaries with the best incentive structure. Many
authors interpret Article 11(1)(4) indents 4 and 5 ISD as a mandatory rule
which imposes information duties.68 According to this view, clients cannot
67. In investment services, apparently in 50–75% of the cases intermediaries sell own
products or products of members of the same group of companies: see Stiftung Warentest,
Finanztest 12/1997, p. 13 et seq.
68. This is often thought to be the case in Germany: see Köndgen, “Rules of Conduct – fur-
ther harmonization” in Ferrarini (Ed.), European Securities Markets – the Investment Services
Directive and beyond (Kluwer, 1998), p. 115, 117 and 128 et seq.; Koller, supra note 66, para
91, 126–128; Metz, “Discount-Broker – Bankgeschäfte und technologische Veränderungen”,
(1996) Verbraucher und Recht, 183, 183 et seq.; and to a certain extent even the German legis-
lature: Bundestags-Drucksache 12/7918, p. 104; and also the German Securities and Exchange
Commission: Principle No. 3.2 of “Richtlinie des Bundesaufsichtsamtes für den Wertpapier-
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opt for the execution of the transaction only and renounce the information and
advice and pay smaller commissions. As many transactions can be executed
only by investment banks, especially in listed stock, clients cannot opt for the
execution of the transaction without counselling, for which they have to pay.
This drains the pure counseling market, as customers will typically not want
to pay twice.
6.2. Freedom of choice
Apart from adequate information, which the party concerned can process,
there is a need that the party can still act on it, i.e. that it still has the
freedom of choice. Typically, this is not problematic in European contract
law, but it is potentially so in company law.69 A number of cases have to
be distinguished. Those rules concerning the acting of the company with
respect to third parties are no different from those in European contract law.
The same is true for cases in which (potential) shareholders are protected in
their investment decisions. For these cases, the 1st and 2nd Company Law
Directives and the Accounting Directives (4th, 7th and 8th Company Law
Directives) should guarantee reliable and understandable information. They
also contain (some) substantive mandatory law, especially within the 2nd
Directive. This is different with rules concerning the relationships within the
company. Information rules supplemented by a freedom of choice have to be
distinguished here from those not supplemented in this way. The first kind
is still the normal case, at least as far as the adopted measures go. The law
of restructuring – only the 3rd and the 6th Company Law Directives (merger
and scission) have been adopted – is based on four elements: information
given by the board in a restructuring plan; certification of the information via
independent inspection; and then two further options: by the shareholders as
a group on the plan as a whole, or (mostly) also by the individual shareholder
on his personal investment.70
handel zur Konkretisierung der §§ 31 und 32 WpHG für das Kommissions-, Festpreis- und
Vermittlungsgeschäft der Kreditinstitute” of 26 May 1997, BAnz. (1997), 6586.
69. See in more detail for the following Grundmann, supra note 10.
70. Hommelhoff and Riesenhuber, “Strukturmaßnahmen, insbesondere Verschmelzung und
Spaltung im Europäischen und deutschen Gesellschaftsrecht” in Grundmann, supra note 11,
p. 259, 272–279 (also for exceptions and for a similar model in other cases of restructuring);
similar view: Lutter, op. cit. supra note 53, 1, 4 (these are “instruments ... modern and efficient”).
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7. Outlook: Information problems as the core question in systems
competition
It is not just the EC Treaty itself which gives supremacy to information
rules over substantive mandatory law when possible: in secondary law too,
especially in European contract law, information rules dominate. Various
mechanisms are employed in order to enable the party which is less informed
to take rational wealth-maximizing decisions. The techniques vary according
to whether search goods, experience goods or credence goods are involved.
The advantage of an information model which justifies its supremacy in
EC law is that market mechanisms are to a large extent maintained, and with
this also the freedom of the person and parties’ autonomy. Public decision
does not discard individual preferences. Wherever this is possible, the prin-
ciple of proportionality speaks in favour of this solution. A second advantage,
now of integration policy, is that consensus can be reached more easily for
information rules. Disputes about content and about mandatory substantive
solutions can be avoided. The legislative history of the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive is illustrative in this respect. There was consensus that information
asymmetries were such that the range of possible choices had to be consid-
erably reduced in order to protect the client. However, it was not possible to
harmonize the points of reference from which the professional should not be
allowed to diverge substantially. On these points, national law was upheld.
This approach was criticized because the same clause could be judged unfair
under one national law in combination with the Directive and be the solu-
tion proposed by the legislature in another country and then even be exempt
from any control under Article 4 of the Directive.71 The concentration on
information rules and the fact that the Community legislature is particularly
innovative in this area is understandable.
Information is, however, important also where no harmonization has taken
place. This concerns national rules going beyond the minimum standard
introduced by the EU and national rules falling outside the ambit of application
of a Community measure. In these areas, systems competition is growing
stronger. This is particularly true for European contract law. For most areas
there is freedom to choose the law applicable to contracts. The other areas have
mostly been subject to harmonization, giving each seller the right to design
his or her products and conditions according to his or her law and sell them all
71. Remien, “AGB-Gesetz und Richtlinie über mißbräuchliche Verbrauchervertragsklauseln
in ihrem europäischen Umfeld”, (1994) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (ZEuP), 34, 59;
tending the same way, Joerges, “Europäisierung des Privatrechts als Rationalisierungsprozeß
und als Streit der Disziplinen – eine Analyse der Richtlinie über mißbräuchliche Klauseln in
Verbraucherverträgen”, (1995) ZEuP, 181, 185; for an opposite view see Grundmann, supra
note 2, 2.10 paras. 12–14.
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over the Community, providing his or her law reaches the minimum standard
of the Directive. If, therefore, the systems increasingly compete, because
borders become more permeable, information becomes the core problem
for the efficiency of such competition. If the demand side is to profit from
such competition it has to be in a position to receive and process material
information and to take rational wealth-maximizing decisions on this basis. A
condition of systems competition is not only the opening of borders but also, as
shown in information economics since the 1970s, the existence of intelligent
information rules which render the competing conditions transparent. The
lessons derived from standard term contracts, annual percentage rates and
labelling rules, have to be applied at a new level if the constitutional framework
for an interplay of integrated national legal orders is to work efficiently.72
(Contract) freedom and information – these are core questions for an Internal
Market Law.
72. On these questions, which become still more important after the Commission’s Com-
munication on European Contract Law, supra note 59, see Grundmann and Stuyck (Eds.),
An Academic Green paper on European Contract Law (Kluwer, 2002), esp. the papers by
Kirchner and by Grundmann and Kerber.

